Vol.3, August 6, 2024

What is happening in East Asian Maritime Security? The Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) publishes the biweekly newsletter, “East Asian Maritime Security (EAMS)” and updates the information on maritime security relevant to East Asia and Japan's territory.

Monthly Column

By

Saya Kiba

Associate Professor, Kobe City University of Foreign Studies

Emerging minilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific: What is it for?

As an unintended consequence, the South China Sea is becoming the gateway to demonstrate the effectiveness of Japan's new and old security cooperation measures.

A free, open, and stable ocean based on the rule-based maritime order is essential to the peace and prosperity of Japan and the international community as a whole. In order to maintain and develop such an order, Japan has expanded its security and defense cooperation programs to Indo-Pacific countries, especially to the partners in Southeast Asia over the past 12 years, combining existing and new components of the assistance menu, including 1) Capacity-Building Programs by Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) personnel, 2) defense equipment transfer, 3) Official Development Assistance (ODA), and 4) Official Security Assistance (OSA).

Ultimately, the Philippines became one of the first countries to receive a combination of these programs, given its lack of external defense capabilities and China's recent coercive actions in the disputed waters of the South China Sea, particularly in the Second Thomas Shoal. Even under the previous administration in the Philippines of President Rodrigo Duterte, who has been critical of relying on the U.S.-Philippine alliance, bureaucrats and members of the foreign and defense policy communities in Japan and the Philippines have been discussing together, with all options on the table, what kind of defense cooperation would be possible. Following the election of Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr. as president, defense ties between the two countries developed rapidly. In July this year, the defense and foreign ministers of the two countries signed the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), which will facilitate the entry of equipment and troops for training and disaster relief operations, thus facilitating military-to-military exchanges between Manila and Tokyo.

We should keep in mind that such a pact is not limited to bilateral projects. Rather, we should focus on the regional spillover effects of such agreements. However, not only in Japan-Philippines relations, Japan's recent deepening of security cooperation and dialogue with specific countries (known as minilateralism) does not seem to be welcomed or understood by neighboring partners.

After the signing of the RAA, I was interviewed by the media in Taiwan and Singapore, who asked me whether Japan would send the JSDF to the Philippines if it was attacked by another country.

They have confused the RAA with the Mutual Defense Treaty. It does not mean that they are frightened or alarmed by Japan's military buildup. The policy elites in these countries are just wondering whether Japan has changed its position on not sending its troops to other countries for combat operations. Moreover, they know little about Japan's shift in security policy and the new institutions and programs that have gradually been put in place over the past decade.

The Taiwanese media was also concerned about whether the coastal surveillance radar systems that Japan would provide to the Philippines under the OSA would monitor the waters surrounding the Taiwan Strait. (Who knows? The operation of the surveillance radars is confidential, and the system has not yet been delivered.) An Indonesian political scientist told me, "If the Philippines and Japan, or Vietnam and Japan, were to make defense deals without sufficient explanation to neighboring countries, such minilateralism would be more likely to arouse the suspicions of other neighboring countries.

These are plausible arguments. Japan hosted a special summit in 2023 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of ASEAN-Japan friendship and cooperation, and the title of the Joint Vision Statement was "Trusted Partners.” Japan's move to strengthen defense ties with a particular country should not shake this trust that Japan and its Southeast Asian partners have built.

On July 11, I had the opportunity to speak at the annual South China Sea conference of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington, DC-based think tank. This was just three days after Japan and the Philippines concluded the RAA. The keynote speaker was Dr. Ely Ratner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense since the beginning of the Biden administration. He said, “The historic growth in the alliance between the United States and the Philippines has helped enable a growing community of minilateral cooperation across the region.”

As he noted, the emerging grouping of like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific who share a vision of what the region can and should look like is unique and different from traditional alliances. Defense networks in the region used to be dominated by the U.S.-led "hub and spokes" alliances with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. Recently,  Japan, one of the spokes, has sought to strengthen bilateral and minilateral defense ties with other spoke countries and like-minded partners. On this point, Dr. Ratner noted, “The future we’re striving toward is one with greater interoperability and cooperation among likeminded Indo-Pacific partners. And this means enhanced reciprocal access, more participation in larger and more complex regional exercises, greater investment together in advanced capabilities. And Manila stands at an intersection of all of that. Now the new convergence in the Indo-Pacific won’t always start or include the United States, and nor should it. That’s why, for example, we are really encouraged by the important opportunities that will emerge from the RAA announced just this week between Japan and the Philippines.”

When it was my turn to speak at the conference, I argued that Japan, together with its partners, must clearly explain to its regional neighbors how Japan's new security assistance programs based on the Free and Open Indo-Pacific meet the common interests of Southeast Asian countries, what Japan has done so far, and what emerging minilateral cooperation and dialogues can bring tangible public goods to the region.

In March 2023, during a visit to India, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida reaffirmed new core elements of FOIP. There are various views on FOIP. The concept of FOIP is the defense of "freedom" and "the rule of law," he said. He also emphasized that the important principle of FOIP is respect for "diversity," "inclusiveness," and "openness," and that Japan does not exclude anyone or impose values. Historical and cultural diversity of each country, and "equal partnership" among nations are also mentioned. However, it still does not seem to be well recognized by our counterparts. When I participated in an exchange program for mid-career think tank leaders between the QUAD (Japan-Australia-India-U.S.) and ASEAN countries in Indonesia in June, I found that a significant number of scholars in Southeast Asia remain highly skeptical of the QUAD or any minilateral mechanism/arrangement that is even remotely related to security.

Therefore, Japan needs to do more to get the message out, with policymakers, bureaucrats, and researchers all working together. We probably need more dialogue with intellectuals and those in policy communities in Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Taiwan, and other key players in the Indo-Pacific region.

I would like to clarify three points.

First, Japan has no legal basis to deploy the JSDF to the South China Sea for combat operations. The recent RAA between Japan and the Philippines does not commit the two countries to mutual defense. It simplifies logistical procedures, including customs, immigration, and quarantine (CIQ), to facilitate troop exchanges.

Second, this RAA was not formed suddenly in response to the recent violent incidents at Second Thomas Reef. In light of Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) in the Philippines and Japan's month-long deployment of the JSDF for disaster relief in 2013, the need for force protection for each service member began to be discussed in high-level bilateral dialogues in 2015.

Third, Japan's engagement in the South China Sea through bilateral and multilateral frameworks is not because it wants to get involved in the conflict. It is because it is in everyone's interest to keep this water area free and open, to maintain peace and stability in the sea lanes, and to that end, international law should give weight to the violent acts of those involved.

Statistical Data and Analysis (as of July 31)

The China Coast Guard has been navigating in the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands on a daily basis, although the number of consecutive navigating days was interrupted at 215 days due to the Typhoon No.3. However, compared to late June and the first half of July, the number of intrusions into Japanese territorial waters by China appears to be decreasing. It is unclear at this point whether the decreasing frequency of China’s intrusions is a short-term response to the typhoon or a long-term trend, and the situation needs to be carefully monitored.

China's ongoing aggressive maritime expansion has prompted historic cooperation between Japan and Taiwan on July 18. The coast guards of Taiwan and Japan conducted a joint drill to prepare for contingencies in the East and South China Seas. This was the first time since Japan and Taiwan severed diplomatic relations in 1972.

On July 28, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) was held, and Japan and US officials reiterated their strong opposition to the China’s intensifying attempts to unilaterally change the status quo in the East China Sea by force or coercion. The US side reaffirmed that Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands. Immediately after the meeting, China expressed grave concerns and opposed Japan and the U.S., alleging that they were "falsely" accusing China on maritime issues. It is reported that China summoned Mr. Yokochi, minister of the Embassy of Japan in China, to lodge serious protests with Japan. Mr. Yokochi, according to the embassy, properly explained the Japanese government's position and reiterated Japan's position on various issues concerning China.

[Statistical Data as of July 31]

Japan Coast Guard (JCG) daily updates the statistical data on the number of China Coast Guard vessels entering in the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands and intruding into Japanese territorial waters. The below is from the website of JCG.

(https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/mission/senkaku/senkaku.html)

July

Contiguous zone

Territorial sea

June

Contiguous zone

Territorial sea

16

4

2

24

17

4

25

18

4

26

19

4

27

20

4

28

4

21

4

29

4

22

4

30

3

23

4

31

4

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