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Monthly Column
by
Yoji KODA
Former Commander in Chief, Self Defense Fleet
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
Outlook of the Current Situation
in the East China Sea and South China Sea Areas
Due to the recent fierce and prolonged armed conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, as well as the effects of the "Trump 2.0" U.S. Administration, China’s coercive and self-righteous
maneuvers in East China Sea (ECS) and South China Seas (SCS) have been attracting less attention than in the past. However, China is cleverly taking advantage of weaker concerns over maritime issues in the SCS and ECS, and it has been steadily expanding its
willful and aggressive maneuvers in the two seas.
South China Sea
In the SCS, to say nothing of its self-righteous claim of territory within the "Nine-Dashed Lines", and related hard maneuvers based on that claim, China has started finger-pointing
at the Republic of the Philippines (the Philippines) over maritime issues.
China is taking a harder position toward the Philippines over several disputed coral atolls, rocks and shoals than before. Especially, China's deployment of coast guard (CCG)
cutters to block supply operations to the Philippines' controlled 2nd Thomas Shoal. CCG cutters use water-cannon bombardment and ramming tactics against Philippine boats which provide supplies to a small unit of the Philippine Marines stationed at the shoal.
Due to China’s unprofessionally dangerous maneuvers, serious damages and injuries among the Philippines CG personnel and boats have been reported.
In addition to 2nd Thomas Shoal, China has been pursuing ruthless tactics against Philippine CG
ships and fishing boats at the disputed Scarborough Atoll -- which is in the Philippines’ EEZ but under China’s practical control. Several eye-to-eye, stare-down-type maneuvers, accompanied by occasional physical collisions between the cutters of each CG have
occurred. These incidents have the potential to escalate into a larger, head-on clash between the armed forces of the two nations.
In order to ease the current stressful relations between the Philippines and China, several diplomatic
dialogues were conducted, and both parties reached basic agreements to prevent further incidents from happening. However, contrary to general expectations, maritime confrontations between the two CG units still continue, and tensions in the SCS are getting
even worse than before.
Other things that should not be overlooked are China’s attempts to willfully influence regional/coastal
nations around the SCS. China craftily and stealthily approaches some coastal nations, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, using all possible measures.
East China Sea
With regard to the ECS, China’s assertive activities over the Senkaku Islands, backed by aggressive force-building of CCG cutters and aircraft, looks to be an everlasting challenge
to Japan. CCG deployed two cutters around the Senkakus in 2020. Thereafter, CCG started increasing the number of cutters deployed to Senkakus to about three during 2021~2023. Finally, four cutters were deployed in 2024 -- as a standardized composition of a
CCG “Senkakus Task Group".
There are several noteworthy episodes involving China’s deployments around the Senkakus. The first is the employment of the world's largest CG cutters, e.g., the 12,000-ton,
165-meter, ZHAOTOU-Class cutter (Type 2901), which carries two helicopters. Another is the fact that all of the deployed cutters are now equipped with either a 35~40mm gun or a larger 76mm gun. This is a striking change from 2020~2023. During that time, there
was only one armed-cutter in a deployed CCG group. Last but not least is the China’s intention regarding the Senkakus. Judging from the changes to China’s CCG cutter deployment patterns after 2020, it seems to have set up a policy of keeping four cutters around
Senkaku for 365 days/year, except during an extremely rough typhoon in the fall. In this context, China deployed four cutters to the area for about 360 days in 2024.
All of these Chinese actions are proof of China’s intent to keep uninterrupted political and psychological pressures on Japan, and to weaken Japanese determination to protect
the Senkakus. However, Japan is taking a clear position to protect its sovereignty over the Senkakus from China’s crafty operations by using all means.
Today, depending on situations, Japan is keeping three to five Japan CG (JCG) cutters deployed to Senkaku waters throughout a year to prevent China’s adventurism. In order
to realize this national objective, the Government of Japan (GOJ) has been strengthening JCG’s capability. About 10 new and large cutters are assigned to JCG’s 11th District at Ishigaki Island, which is responsible for Senkaku operations. In addition to this,
a new JCG base, with the same number of JCG cutters, and is capable of supporting full-scale operations around Senkakus, became operational at Kagoshima. A new JCG airbase is also in active status in Fukuoka Prefecture. Both bases are located Japan’s westmost
main island of Kyushu.
Another concern is illegal transit of PLAN’s survey/intelligence-ships within Japan’s territorial
waters west of Kuchi-no-Erabu-Jima Island (Tokara Strait, This is not “Straits used for international navigation”), off the coast of southern Kyushu. China’s position on this issue is that these ships have exercised the right of "Transit Passage" under UNCLOS.
However, Chinese ships should instead use Osumi Strait, which has international water transit lanes and is located nearby Kuchi-no-Erabu-Jima. So, GOJ strongly opposes China’s position of Transit Passage. This is a clear violation of UNCLOS and Japan’s territorial
sovereignty.
Japan’s Courses of Action against China’s Assertive Maritime Maneuvers
The abovementioned maritime actions of China have been subjects of serious concern for the security of Japan and the region. Below is a list of recommended courses of action
for GOJ to counter China’s assertive maritime maneuvers.
a. GOJ should get rid of current excessive-consideration toward China and take clear policies to counter China’s crafty activities in the region.
b. GOJ should depart from current “diplomatic protest only” policy to China and start to make reciprocal and proportional activities against China’s self-righteous maneuvers
that ignore UNCLOS. Some examples would be: Japanese ships conduct transit operations in Taiwan strait whenever CCG cutters intrude into Senkakus waters or PLAN ships transit through Japan’s territorial waters south of Kyushu.
c. GOJ should conduct Japanese "Freedom of Navigation Operations" in the SCS.
d. GOJ should conduct large scale Japan-U.S. military exercises to match future high-end combat/war with foreign nation(s).
e. GOJ should help regional nations’ capacity building of their sea-powers and strengthen intelligence-sharing networks that cover all of the SCS and ECS.
Statistical Data and Analysis
(as of February 27)
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Chinese and Russian vessels and aircrafts continue to be active in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan and East Asia.
Chinese Coast Guard vessels continue to operate in the waters around Senkaku Islands, entering in Japanese contiguous zone for about 100 consecutive
days. On February 12, an intrusion into Japanese territorial water was also confirmed. This is the second time this year.
A Russian intelligence-gathering vessel has been navigating relentlessly in close to Japan's territorial waters. It has been confirmed that
this vessel has been continuously navigating Japanese contiguous zone off Okinawa, Miyazaki, and Nagasaki prefectures. The persistent harassment is attracting a great deal of attention, as well as the question of where the military objectives lie.
In the South China Sea, Chinese aircrafts have conducted “unsafe and unprofessional” actions and “dangerous flight maneuvers” against Australian
and Philippines’s aircrafts.
[Statistical Data as of February 27]
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Japan Coast Guard (JCG) daily updates the statistical data on the number of China Coast Guard vessels entering in the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands
and intruding into Japanese territorial waters. The below is from the website of JCG.
(https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/mission/senkaku/senkaku.html)
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Feb.
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Contiguous zone
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Territorial
sea
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Feb.
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Contiguous zone
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Territorial
sea
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12
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4
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4
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21
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2
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13
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4
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22
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4
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14
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4
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23
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4
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|
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15
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4
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24
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4
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16
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4
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25
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4
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17
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2
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26
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4
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18
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2
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27
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4
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19
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4
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28
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20
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2
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