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Monthly Column
by
TAKEI Tomohisa
Admiral (Ret.), Former Chief of Staff, Maritime Self-Defense Force
The Lack of Domestic Laws to Protect Maritime Interests is a Weak Link in Japan’s Maritime Security
According to media reports, on December 25th 2024, it was revealed that a buoy with Chinese writing on it had been placed approximately 14km inside Japan's exclusive economic
zone (EEZ), about 140km southwest of Hateruma Island in Okinawa Prefecture.
As with the buoy placed near the Senkaku Islands in July 2023, the Japanese government has taken the position that "the installation of structures in Japan's EEZ without consent
violates the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)" and has demanded their immediate removal through diplomatic channels. In addition, on December 25, Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya, who was visiting Beijing, made it clear
at a press conference after his meeting with Foreign Minister Wang Yi that he had demanded the immediate removal of the new buoy.
At a press conference on December 27, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning claimed that “the buoy placed in the sea area under China's jurisdiction is for the purpose
of meteorological observation and is reasonable and legal,” and indicated that they would not respond to requests for immediate removal. *1
The day after the installation of the buoy was reported, a Taiwan Coast Guard officer posted at the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Tokyo told me, “This
buoy is illegally laid within Taiwan's EEZ.”
In short, Japan, China and Taiwan each claim that the buoy reported on December 25 is within their own EEZ. The arguments of the three countries are not wrong from their own
perspective, and therefore they will never meet.
In the end, the buoy off Hateruma Island will not be forcibly removed by the Japanese Government in the same way as the buoy off the Senkaku Islands. The reason for this is
that a combination of the following factors makes it difficult for the Japanese Government to make a policy decision.
Firstly, the three parties have not been able to reach an agreement on jurisdiction over territorial waters, EEZs and continental shelves based on UNCLOS. Japan and China ratified
UNCLOS in 1996. In addition, China submitted a declaration regarding UNCLOS on August 25, 2006, and Article 2 of this declaration states that “The People's Republic of China will effect, through consultations, the delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction
with the states with coasts opposite or adjacent to China respectively on the basis of international law and in accordance with the equitable principle.”*2 However, negotiations with Japan have made no progress at all.
The main reason is in China. First, China claimed "sovereignty" over the Senkaku Islands after it was pointed out in 1968 that there was a possibility that oil resources were
buried in the waters around the Senkaku Islands. China had never before challenged Japan's sovereignty over the islands, and the Senkaku Islands are Japan's inherent territory both historically and in practice, so China's argument has no basis.*3 Similarly,
due to possibility of rich deposits of undersea resources in the Okinawa Trough, and China is attempting to demarcate its continental shelf along a line much closer to Japan than the Japan-China median line, which conflicts with Japan's claim that the Nansei
Islands are on the edge of the continental shelf extending from the Eurasian continent and that the continental shelf in the East China Sea should therefore be demarcated along the median line.
What complicates the situation is that China declared in 2006 in Article 2 of the Declaration: "The People's Republic of China reaffirms its sovereignty over all its archipelagos
and islands as listed in Article 2 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone promulgated on February 25, 1992". China has stipulated that the “islands” in Article 2 of the Law include the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu
Island, as claimed by China) along with the islands of the South China Sea.*4 In other words, in order to delineate territorial waters and EEZs based on UNCLOS, the declaration is an obstacle, and it is a precondition that China either rewrites its laws and
stops claiming the Senkaku Islands, or that Japan recognizes China's claims.
In 2013, the first year of the Xi Jinping administration, the Chinese government added the Senkaku Islands to its list of core interests. Since then, any concession to Japan
over the Senkaku Islands has become an issue that directly affects President Xi Jinping's political legitimacy. In other words, there is almost no chance that Japan and China will reach an agreement on the delimitation of the East China Sea in the foreseeable
future.
Secondly, because Taiwan is not a member of UNCLOS and does not have diplomatic relations with Japan, Japan and Taiwan cannot conduct the diplomatic negotiations necessary for
delimitation. Of course, even if a country is not a member of UNCLOS or does not have formal diplomatic relations with Japan, it is still possible to delimit the EEZ between the two.
In this case, however, there would be a discrepancy with the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué. From China's point of view, Taiwan is part of China, and the decision on the
delimitation of the EEZ off Hateruma Island will be made by China, and Taiwan has no right to be at the negotiating table. But although the Japanese government understands and respects the Chinese government's position that Taiwan is part of China, from the
standpoint of upholding the Potsdam Declaration, it hasn't mentioned the issue of Taiwan's diplomatic status. In addition, the Chinese government does not actually control Taiwan or the waters surrounding Taiwan, so negotiations between the Japanese government
and the Chinese government would be ineffective.
Thirdly, even if Japan is able to exercise its jurisdiction over the EEZ off Hateruma Island, there are no provisions in Japanese domestic law that explicitly state the legal
interests that should be protected as a reason for removing buoys that have been placed in the EEZ without permission, and therefore the government ministry with jurisdiction is also unclear, making it difficult to remove them. According to media reports,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that the removal of the buoy is a "legal gray area,”*5 but this is believed to be a statement that takes into account the fact that UNCLOS does not have clear provisions on what physical measures concerned countries
are allowed to take against countries that violate the treaty, such as the installation of the buoy in this case, and that Japan also currently lacks laws to protect the rights allowed under UNCLOS.
The current situation, in which domestic laws protecting the rights recognized by UNCLOS have yet to be enacted, is the greatest vulnerability for Japan's maritime security.
International law scholar Atsuko Kanehara has long been sounding the alarm over Japan's lack of a law on the protection of territorial waters and the absence of a legal definition of the protected interests in territorial waters, even for areas more important
than the EEZ.*6 The Japanese government should urgently enact the necessary legislation to remedy this weakness.
Note
*1「中国 日本のEEZ内にブイ設置 日本側求める即時撤去に応じず[China has refused to comply
with Japan's request for the immediate removal of a buoy it placed in Japan's EEZ.]」NHK Web, December 28, 2024,
https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20241228/k10014681601000.html
*2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Chapter XXI LAW OF THE SEA, The United Nations Treaty Collection,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en#EndDec
*3外務省[Ministry Foreign Affairs Japan]「尖閣諸島に関する３つの真実{Three
facts regarding the Senkaku Islands}」, November 2012,
https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/senkaku/pdfs/3shinjitu.pdf
*4 Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, China’s
Leader in Online Legal Research, https://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=670
*5
高橋杏璃[Anri Takahashi],
“中国ブイ10カ月経つも放置 尖閣周辺「法的グレー」に苦慮する日本[China's buoy left for 10 months, Japan struggling with
‘legal gray’ waters around Senkaku]”, Asahishinbun Digital, May 8, 2024,
https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASS572QBTS57UTFK00LM.html
*6
兼原敦子[Atsuko Kanehara],
“領海警備にかかる法整備の提言[Proposal for the development of legislation for territorial waters security]”,
上智大学法学論集第65巻第4号[Volume 65, Number 4 of the Sophia Law Review ], March 20, 2022,
https://digital-archives.sophia.ac.jp/repository/view/repository/20220602003
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Statistical Data and Analysis
(as of January 19)
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During the year-end and New Year's period, Chinese military vessels and
Chinese Coast Guard vessels
have been continuously observed in the waters around Japan while Japan-China Foreign Minister’s meeting was held in late December. In this period some events were newly reported. Coordinated activities between
Chinese Navy and Chinese Coast Guard were reported in the area between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island. Four Chinese Coast Guard’s vessels all equipped with 76mm guns
entered the contiguous zones around the Senkakus. These two events are worth noting.
The number of days that Chinese Coast Guard’s vessels entering the contiguous zones around the Senkakus in the last year hit 355 days. This is the highest frequency in a single
year since the nationalization of the Senkaku Islands.
[Statistical Data as of January 19]
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Japan Coast Guard (JCG) daily updates the statistical data on the number of China Coast Guard vessels entering in the contiguous zone around
the Senkaku Islands and intruding into Japanese territorial waters. The below is from the website of JCG.
(https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/mission/senkaku/senkaku.html)
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Dec.
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Contiguous zone
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Territorial
sea
|
Dec.
|
Contiguous zone
|
Territorial
sea
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|
27
|
3
|
|
8
|
8
|
4
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|
28
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4
|
|
9
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4
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|
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29
|
4
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|
10
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4
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|
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30
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4
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11
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4
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|
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31
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4
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12
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4
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Jan
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Contiguous zone |
Territorial |
13
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4
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1
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4
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14
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4
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2
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4
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15
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4
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|
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3
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4
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16
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4
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|
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4
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4
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17
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4
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5
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4
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18
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4
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6
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4
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19
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4
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7
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4
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Date
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Topics
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1/1
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According to several Japanese government officials, Chinese Navy and Chinese Coast Guard conducted coordinated activities that could be taken as an exercise for a maritime
blockade toward Taiwan in the area between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island in December of last year. These activities were confirmed for the first time in this area.
According to the same source, four Chinese Coast Guard’s vessels equipped with 76mm guns entered the contiguous zones around the Senkakus on December 6 of last year. This
is the first time that all four vessels were heavily armed with 76mm guns.
________________________________________
Yomiuri News (Japanese)
https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/national/20241231-OYT1T50105/
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1/4
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The number of days that Chinese Coast Guard’s vessels entering the contiguous zones around the Senkakus had reached 355 days in 2024. This is the highest frequency in a single
year since the nationalization of the Senkaku Islands.
________________________________________
Sankei News (Japanese)
https://www.sankei.com/article/20250104-3A3R46TIN5CM5OL5H3JGIF7E6I/
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1/6
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Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF) has confirmed two Chinese Naval vessels: the Luyang
Ⅲclass destroyer (hull number 134) and Sovremennyy class destroyer (hull number 136) sailing
south in the waters 110 km northeast of Miyako Island on January 2. These vessels then crossed the Miyako strait and navigated to the Pacific Ocean.
(Source: Japan Joint Staff)
________________________________________
Japan Joint Staff
https://www.mod.go.jp/js/pdf/2025/p20250106_01.pdf
（Source: Japan Joint Staff）
________________________________________
Japan Joint Staff
https://www.mod.go.jp/js/pdf/2025/p20250106_02.pdf
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1/6
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JMSDF has confirmed one Chinese Dongdiao class Intelligence ship (hull number 796) sailing west in the waters 70km northeast of Tanegashima Island (Kagoshima Prefecture) on
January 5. This vessel then crossed the Osumi Strait and navigated to the East China Sea.
(Source: Japan Joint Staff)
________________________________________
Japan Joint Staff
https://www.mod.go.jp/js/pdf/2025/p20250106_02.pdf
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1/6
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Japan Ministry of Defense announced on January 6 North Korea launched at least one ballistic missile into the Sea of Japan. The ballistic missile was estimated
to have flown about 1,100 km at a maximum altitude of about 100 km and fell into the Sea of Japan outside Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
(Source: Japan MoD)
________________________________________
Japan MoD
https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2025/01/06c.html
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1/7
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Taiwan's Coast Guard announced on January 6 that a cargo ship with Chinese nationals on board is suspected of damaging undersea cables in the waters north of Taiwan. According
to the announcement, a Cameroon-flag cargo ship is suspected of damaging undersea cables in the waters north of Taiwan on January 3, and is being investigated. The owner of the cargo ship is Hong Kong-registered and all seven crew members are Chinese. Taiwan’s
authorities said they cannot rule out the possibility that the damage is the result of "gray zone" operations by China. Taiwanese media reported that the cargo ship is suspected of having lowered its anchor when it sailed through the area of the site.
________________________________________
NHK News (Japanese)
https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20250107/k10014686421000.html
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1/14
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South Korea's military says North Korea launched multiple short-range ballistic missiles eastward on January 14. The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff says it detected the
launch at around 9:30 a.m. on That day from the Ganggye area in North Korea's northern province of Jagang. The missiles flew toward the Sea of Japan. The JCS says they flew about 250 kilometers before falling into the sea.
________________________________________
NHK World News (English)
https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20250114_17/
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1/14
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Japan Joint Staff confirmed one Chinese UAV (estimated) flying from East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean through the area between Yonaguni island and Taiwan on January 14.
This Chinese UAV (estimated) then turned over the Pacific Ocean and flew to East China Sea through the area between Yonaguni island and Taiwan again. (Red line in the below chart)
Japan Joint Staff also confirmed another Chinese UAV (estimated), flying from the Pacific Ocean to East China Sea through the area between Yonaguni island and Taiwan in
another time of the same day. (Yellow line in the below chart)
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