The People’s Republic of China (PRC) published the map of South China Sea in 1953, and they drew the nine-dash line which enclosed the four groups of Islands: Pratas Islands, Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, and Macclesfield Bank. China asserted that “All of the four groups of Islands belong to China.” The Philippine government declared 53 Islands in the South China Sea belonged to the Philippines in 1956. Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei also asserted their territorial claims in the South China Sea. The four Southeast Asian Nations and Chinese territorial claims overlapped each other. China could not explain the legal significance and the validity of nine-dash line, and the Chinese naval capacity was limited, so that the maritime disputes have not escalated until 1990th.
The Chinese maritime offensive against the Philippines in the South China Sea had begun in 1994.[1] The Chinese maritime militia occupied the Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands, and they constructed three octagonal structures on the reef between June and December 1994. A Filippino fisherman informed the Chinese occupation to the Philippine navy in February 1995. The Philippines tried to persuade China to remove the structures. China rejected this request, but China and the Philippines agreed the joint statement on PRC-RP Consultations on the South China Sea and on Other Areas of Cooperation on 10 August 1995. China’s conciliatory posture was welcomed by the Philippine government. But they were afraid of Chinese creeping occupation & reclamation in the South China Sea. The Straits Times reported the Chinese expansion of the structures in the Mischief Reef on 11 November 1998. A five-story concrete structure was completed in early 1999.[2]
The Philippine Defense Secretary Orland Sanchez Mercado ordered the Philippine Navy to beach the Tank Landing Ship BRP Sierra Madre at the Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea on 9 May 1999 to reinforce its claims over disputed waters around the shoal, and it has since maintained a small contingent of marines there.[3] The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) foreign ministers tried to stop Chinese maritime offensive in the South China Sea. The Philippines and Vietnam suggested the draft of code of conduct (COC) in the South China Sea in the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) on 23 July 1999. ASEAN-China Summit meeting on 28 November 1999 discussed the COC, and finally they agreed the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) on 4 November 2002. The Chinese diplomats requested the set-up of the working group to drafting the guidelines for the implementation of the DOC with ASEAN members. Their objective was to delay the implementation of the DOC, and to buy some time for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy to occupy reefs in the South China Sea.
The guidelines for the implementation of the declaration of conduct on the South China Sea was published in 2011. It took 9 years from the publication of DOC. Further, the ASEAN foreign ministers failed to reach a joint statement including reference to the Philippine and Vietnamese territorial disputes with China in July 2012, because Cambodia, a close ally of China blocked any reference to the dispute. Henry S Bensurto Jr. a Filippino diplomat had afraid that the Philippines would lose the game if they had no legal leverage.[4] He thought of the idea to utilize the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in Hague. He suggested that the Philippines shall institute the arbitration, and finally, his boss, Albert del Rosario, Secretary of Foreign Affairs announced that the Philippines took the step of bringing China before an Arbitral Tribunal under Article 287 and Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in order to achieve a peaceful and durable solution to the dispute over the South China Sea (West Philippine Sea: WPS) on 22 January 2013.[5]
Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines was also summoned to the Department of Foreign Affairs on the same day, and he was handed a Note Verbale by Assistant Secretary Teresa Lazaro. The Note Verbale contain the Notification and Statement of Claim that challenges before the Arbitral Tribunal the validity of China’s nine-dash line claim to almost the entire South China Sea including the WPS and to desist from unlawful activities that violate the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Philippines under the 1982 UNCLOS. China ignored the PCA’s legal procedure, and China dispatched the PLA Navy gunboat and the China Marine Surveillance (CMS) ships to the Second Thomas Shoal in May 2013. Chinese foreign ministry asserted that China had the indisputable sovereignty of the shoal. The CMS renamed China Coast Guard (CCG), and they have dispatched the CCG vessels to disturb the Philippine navy’s resupply mission since then. On July 12, 2016, the arbitral tribunal adjudicating the Philippines’ case against China in the South China Sea ruled overwhelmingly in favor of the Philippines, determining that major elements of China’s claim-including its nine-dash line, recent land reclamation activities, and other activities including collisions in Philippine waters-were unlawful.[6] Henry S. Bensurto Jr. a silent and dedicated expert of UNCLOS, brought the legal victory to his country, though the Philippines’ battle has still continued.
China reacted negatively to the ruling, maintaining it was “null and void.” The CCG’s harassment against the Philippine navy’s resupply mission has escalated year by year. Joint Readout from Australia-Japan-Philippines-United Sates Defense Ministers’ Meeting on 3 May 2024 strongly objected to the dangerous use of CCG and Maritime Militia vessels in the South China Sea. The ministers and secretaries reiterated serious concern over the China’s repeated obstruction of Philippine vessels’ exercise of high seas freedom of navigation and the disruption of supply lines to Second Thomas Shoal, which constitute dangerous and destabilizing conduct. The Philippine military chief, General Romeo Brawner said that CCG crew brandished knives, an axe and other weapons in a clash with Philippine navy vessel on 17 June 2024, and the “Filipino crew had been unarmed and had fought with their bare hands”.[7] A Filipino sailor lost a thumb in the clash, in which the China Coast Guard confiscated or destroyed Philippine equipment including guns, according to the Philippine military.
The Philippines and China have held nine meetings of the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea.[8] They have finally agreed to set up new lines of communication to improve their handling of maritime disputes, according to a document and a Philippine diplomatic source, as ties sour over clashes about territory in the South China Sea.[9] Three communication channels would be established specifically for maritime issues, according to the source, who provided a document with highlights of an Arrangement on Improving Philippines-China Maritime Communication Mechanisms, which was signed on July 2. The first channel would be used by representatives to be designated by their leaders, with the other for respective foreign ministries at ministerial or vice-ministerial level, or their designated representatives, according to the document. The third would involve their respective coast guards “which will be set up once the corresponding Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the coast guards is concluded,” the document said.
The two countries have also reached an understanding on the provisional arrangement for resupply missions to a beached naval ship: BRP Sierra Madre (LT-57) on the Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, Manila’s Department of Foreign Affairs said in a statement on 21 July 2024.[10] The department did not provide details on the arrangement, but it said this followed frank and constructive discussions between the two sides at the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism earlier in July. Both sides continue to recognize the need to de-escalate the situation in the South China Sea and manage differences through dialogue and consultation, and they agree that the arrangement will not prejudice each other’s positions in the South China Sea, the department said.
If China’s maritime policy becomes moderate and conciliatory, it is good news not only for the Philippines but also for the neighboring countries such like the ASEAN countries, the United States of America, Australia, and Japan. But the present writer feels a sense of deja vu on China’s posture. China and Vietnam have the long history of maritime disputes, and it is said that they set up three communication channels; the first channel is for the Communist Party Secretary Generals, the second channel is for the military officers, and the third channel is for the foreign ministries. [11] However, the set-up of military communication channels (hotline) between China and Vietnam have announced several times from 2011 to 2024.[12] It may mean that the set-up of communication channel is not enough to establish the stable relations between military officers of China and the Vietnam. A senior China watcher in Vietnam once told the present writer, “Some time, emergency call has not been accepted. If so, the hotline is, just effective tool for the exchange of the political assertions each other.”[13] Antonio Carpio, a former Philippine Supreme Court Justice knew these circumstances well, and said “we don’t know if the Chinese will answer when we call, so we will have to wait.”[14]
Further, we shall be careful about the CCG’s behaviors in the Second Thomas Shoal. Naoji Shibata, a former Asahi Shimbun reporter visited the BRP Sierra Madre in August 2014.[15] He reported that the hull of BRP Sierra Madre was quite rusty, and the Philippine marine leader advised him to walk on the deck’s beam, otherwise the floor would give way under his feet. An ASEAN informed source pointed out that “the CCG is waiting the collapse of rusty BRP Sierra Madre.”[16] If so, they won’t stop the disturbance against the Filipino resupply mission, because the resupply mission includes maintenance and repair of the rusty hull. The CCG would occupy the shoal after the collapse of the BRP Sierra Madre, and they would reclaim the shoal. China’s conciliatory posture won’t be true. We shall be aware of cold reality.
The Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa emphasized in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on 27 July 2024. “Any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force are unacceptable, not only the seas surrounding Japan such as the East China Sea but also anywhere in the world. In particular, militarization and coercive activities continue in the South China Sea.”[17] Many ASEAN diplomats stressed the importance to develop the DOC into the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea, though we couldn’t know when it would be completed, and how it would be effective.
The Philippine government has always received the defense and security supports from her ally, the U.S. government. Further, the Japanese government has begun to provide these supports to the Philippine government in recent years. The Japanese government has already provided the patrol aircrafts, patrol vessels, and radar system to the Armed Force of the Philippines (AFP) and Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and AFP navy began joint air training in 2015. The Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and the U.S. Coast Guard began the joint training with PCG in 2023. The Philippine government decided to dispatch BRP Teresa Magbanua, a Japanese Kunigami-class Patrol Vessel (96.6 m Length, 2,260 gross tons) to the sea area surrounding Sabina Shoal in the Spratly Islands. She has been sent there since April 16, becoming the longest-deployed asset in the South China Sea as a response to suspected reclamation activities around the shoal.[18]
(Joint exercise between JCG and JMSDF in the South China Sea: Photo courtesy of JCG)
But it is still not enough. To prevent militarization and coercive activities, we need to stress the importance of UNCLOS & invalidity of the nine-dash line, and build the security architecture to monitor, manage and control the situation. First, we shall establish the ASEAN-Japan maritime security cooperation meeting under the venue of Japan-ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, or the East Asian Summit (EAS), because currently Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) is not well functioned. The EAMF was not held in 2016.[19] ASEAN nations shall take an initiative, and they shall develop the communication network among the ministries of foreign affairs and navies, coast guard agencies of regional nations and all the relevant external powers to monitor the maritime incidents and unlawful activities in the East and South China Seas. Secondly, we shall establish the South China Sea Maritime Security Information Sharing Center (MSISC) in one of the ASEAN nations.[20]
The Information Sharing Centre of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP ISC) that was established in Singapore in 2006. The ReCAAP ISC conducts timely and accurate information sharing on incidents of piracy and sea robbery. The ReCAAP ISC manages a network of information sharing with the Focal Points of 20 Contracting Parties.[21] Through this information sharing, the ReCAAP ISC can issue warnings and alerts to the shipping industry and facilitate the responses by the law enforcement agencies of littoral states. It would be a good precedent for the South China Sea MSISC to collect and publish the record of maritime incidents and unlawful activities in the South China Sea. The Japanese government shall give ASEAN nations the financial and technological supports.
The South China Sea MSISC shall cooperate with the regional navies, coast guard agencies and fishery ministries, and collect, analyze the maritime incidents’ information, environmental data, and make statistics, then suggest reports to the ASEAN-Japan maritime security cooperation meeting, ASEAN-Japan foreign ministers meeting, and the EAS. It will be effective to promote a common Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) picture among the regional nations.[22] The MSA idea was composed and promoted by the U. S. A. and NATO forces. The U.S. navy suggested the Global Maritime Situational Awareness (GMSA) idea in 2007.[23] The GMSA is a multi-layered, multi-domain picture that links the identity, location, known patterns and present activity of ships, cargo, people, and hazards within and adjacent to the maritime domain.
This picture derives from the pooling of a comprehensive set of mostly unclassified data contributed by the many agencies and nations with knowledge of the maritime domain, and it is an integral element of maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), which was established in response to “September 11 Terrorist Attacks” in 2001. This picture also will provide the reliable information to the environmental issues and search & rescue operations of the regional navies & maritime law enforcement agencies when the airplane clashes and maritime accidents happen. It may be effective for the search & rescue operation for the missing airplanes such like the Malaysia Airline Flight 370 (MH370) in March 2014.[24] The U.S. experiences of GMSA will suggest the South China Sea MSISC many good examples for its MSA data collection, and processing. If South China Sea MSISC data will have coordinated linkage with the Japanese, American, and Australian Maritime Forces including navies and coast guards, we can help the ASEAN friends including the Philippines to build the durable maritime security capacity.
1 Noel M. Novicio, The South China Sea Dispute in Philippine Foreign Policy, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), IDSS Monograph No. 5, 2003, p.3.
2 John C. Baker and David G. Wiencek eds. Cooperative Monitoring in the South China Sea, Praeger, 2002, p.54.
3 Chen Xiangmiao, History and Reality of Entanglement between China and the Philippines
in Second Thomas Shoal,
http://www.scspi.org/en/dtfx/
4 https://apwmanila2022.law.
5 Statement by Secretary of Foreign Affairs Albert del Rosario on the UNCLOS Arbitral Proceedings against China to Achieve a Peaceful and Durable Solution to the Dispute in the WPS, 24 January 2013.
6 South China Sea Arbitration Ruling: What Happened and What’s Next? 12 July 2016,
https://www.uscc.gov/research/
7 AFP, Chinese sailors seen wielding knives in S. China Sea clash with Philippines, Straits Times, 21 June 2024.
8 China and the Philippines Hold the Ninth Meeting of the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism
on the South China Sea, 2 July 2024, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_
9 Karen Lema and Mikhail Flores, Exclusive: Philippines, China to set up new channels to
handle South China Sea rows, Reuters, 17 July 2024,
https://www.reuters.com/world/
10 Reuters, Manila says deal reached with Beijing on resupply missions to beached ship, Straits Times, 22 July 2024, p. A7.
11 Author’s Interview with a senior Vietnamese scholar on 4 September 2013.
12 James Hardy, Hotline to ease Vietnam-China tensions, Jane’s Defence Weekly 48, no. 36
(September 7, 2011), p. 15, Vien Dong, Vietnam, China to set up Defense Hotline, VOA, 21 October 2014,
https://www.voanews.com/a/
13 Author’s interview with a senior Vietnamese scholar on 4 September 2013.
14 Karen Lema and Mikhail Flores, op. cit.
15 柴田直治「対中国 最前線は座礁船」『朝日新聞』2014年8月18日、1頁。
16 Author’s interview with an ASEAN informed source on 20 February 2024.
17 The 31st ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),
https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/
18 PCG ahips blocked by Chinese vessels during Sabina resupply-report, The Philippine Daily
Inquirer, 26 August 2024,
https://www.inquirer.net/
19 Chen Xiangmiao, History and Reality of Entanglement between China and the Philippines
in Second Thomas Shoal,
http://www.scspi.org/en/dtfx/
20
佐藤考一『「海洋強国」中国と日・米・ASEAN－東シナ海・
21 Background Information, ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre,
http://www.recaap.org/
22 MSA: Crisis Management at Sea—Urgent Proposals from the field, By IIPS Study Group to
follow up on The Yasuhiro Nakasone Proposal on Maritime Security in East Asia, Institute for International Policy Studies, October 2016,
http://www.iips.org/en/
23 Navy Maritime Domain Awareness Concept in May 2007,
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/
24 It was impressive that ICC International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur closely cooperated with Malaysian Government in search of Malaysian Airline Fright 370. They called all the vessels navigating along the Malaysian sea area for the information gathering of the missing airplane. Author’s interview with Captain Noel Choong, director of the Piracy Reporting Centre on 11 March 2014.